Theory says that mutual and stock organizational forms have a comparative advantage in specific contracting dimensions. We examine corporate charter and bylaw provisions from a sample of insurance companies with incorporations spanning the 19th century. We find that charter and bylaw provisions differ in predictable ways across organizational forms. For example, mutual charters and bylaws are more likely than those of stock companies to include provisions restricting the company's operating policies (because mutuals have higher costs of controlling management discretion). Our examination supports the proposition that incentive problems between owners and managers are more pronounced in mutuals. This implies an offsetting benefit, which we interpret as the internalization of owner-customer incentive conflict problems.
Introduction
Corporate governance has received substantial attention from the public, regulators, and academics as a result of recent failures at Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia. Much of this attention has focused on the regulation of governance activities-for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. But most governance texture reflects privately adopted contracts and policies, not public imposition by regulation. One set of internal governance mechanisms that has garnered little systematic attention is the corporate charter and bylaws. 1 The charter is privately adopted by each organization and serves as the primary source of authority for the company. At a minimum, it establishes the firm's name, organizational form, capitalization, scope of business, and process for its amendment. Corporate bylaws are established by the firm's directors at their first meeting and contain detailed rules governing the corporation. In this article we focus on the role of these governance documents in controlling incentive conflicts.
The analysis in Coase (1960) implies that absent contracting costs, charter and bylaw provisions (the assignment of property rights within the firm) will have no effect on real activity choices. But where contracting is costly, differing incentives among the parties to a contract generate conflicts that can affect real activity choices and hence the value of the organization; thus private incentives exist within the process to minimize contracting costs.
The specification of organizational form is a critical charter provision. Because alternative organizational forms limit contracting costs in specific dimensions, other corporate charter and bylaw provisions should differ as well. We argue that the process of minimizing contracting costs implies that charter and bylaw provisions should be chosen to form a coherent package.
We examine data from an industry that exhibits material variation in the choices of ownership structure-the life insurance industry. Variations in the costs of controlling specific incentive problems across firms in this industry imply that common stock and mutual ownership structures are efficient in different circumstances Smith, 1981, 1988; Fama and Jensen, 1983) . For instance, contracting costs are related to factors such as the degree of managerial discretion required for setting rates in a given line of insurance. Generally the more discretion managers are authorized, the greater the potential for those managers to operate in their self-interest at the expense of other parties to the firm. Stock and mutual organizational forms limit, to varying degrees, the discretion afforded particular contracting parties. Hence we examine the costs and benefits of stock and mutual organizational forms in order to identify in more detail the nature of their respective comparative advantages.
Although corporate charters and bylaws are important devices for controlling incentive conflicts within insurance firms, the importance of such contractual mechanisms is not constant over time. The insurance industry is more heavily regulated today than it was a century ago; moreover, regulations are rarely written, so companies may contract around them. For instance, following the imposition of regulations that require life and property insurance be separated into different operating companies, it would be unnecessary for a life company charter to include a provision prohibiting it from selling property insurance. To increase the statistical power of our analysis of these governance documents, we focus on data from a less regulated period. 2 We examine charter and bylaw provisions for a sample of 69 life insurance companies whose incorporations span the 19th century-from 1759 to 1910.
Charter and bylaw provisions are jointly chosen. Because there are interaction effects in their joint selection, how they cluster depends on whether they are complements or substitutes. Our analysis suggests that organizational form 2. Even over our sample period, contractual provisions are not chosen freely by the promoters: before general laws of incorporation, charters were granted by state legislatures. So even during the early years, some oversight of contractual choice is present. Nonetheless, before substantial codification, opportunities for individual (private) choice and influence should have been greater. and operating policy restrictions are complements. Specifically, we argue that the costs of controlling management within mutual insurers are higher than in stock firms; thus mutuals should have a comparative advantage in lines of insurance requiring less managerial discretion (e.g., in lines for which there is extensive loss data). 3 This comparative advantage then implies that mutual charters and bylaws are more likely than those of stock companies to include provisions restricting the company's operating policies.
Predictions for other classes of provisions are ambiguous. For example, the lack of discipline from the external market for corporate control implies that mutuals should detail internal control mechanisms more extensively than would similar common stock companies. But the managerial discretion hypothesis suggests that mutuals operate in lines that require less discretion, reducing the derived demand for monitoring. Thus there are both direct and indirect effects; which dominates is an empirical question.
Provisions restricting investment, financing, and dividend policies face similar ambiguities. These policies can be restricted to control incentive problems between owners and managers, as well as controlling owner-customer conflicts within stock companies. Moreover, the incremental benefits of such provisions are potentially greater within stock companies given their comparative advantage in lines that require more managerial discretion. The relative frequency of such provisions in stock versus mutual charters and bylaws thus is an empirical issue.
In Section 2 we discuss our data. In Section 3 we present our analysis. We first examine alternative organizational forms and incentives of individuals performing the three major functions within the insurance firm-management, owner, and customer functions. We then turn to provisions that specify operating policy, internal control, and investment, financing, and dividend policies. A brief summary concludes the article in Section 4.
Data and Sample Description
Our sample is obtained from The Spectator Company's (1911) Charters of American Life Insurance Companies. This volume compiles original charters with amendments and bylaws of 69 life insurance companies. The bylaws have been edited:
Such by-laws as relate to the mere ordinary routine incident to any business corporation are omitted. . . it having been found expedient to show in as much detail as possible the powers of the officers and committees, as well as their limitations, with regard to the investment of funds and disbursements for expenses. The Spectator Company (1911: preface) 3. Various aspects of this managerial discretion hypothesis have been examined; for instance, Mayers and Smith (1988 , 1994 , Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993) , and Kleffner and Doherty (1996) all provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that different organizational forms have a comparative advantage in different lines of insurance.
Given our purposes, this editing does not appear to be a major issue-those items in which we are most interested appear to correspond closely with those items of interest to the editors. Also, the bylaw extracts appear to be reasonably complete when compared with more modern documents. Thus it is difficult to identify evidence of severe editing. Moreover, for our comparisons to be biased, editing would have to be asymmetric between mutual and stock companies.
Perhaps more important than any editing are the time distributions of incorporation dates for stock and mutual companies, since regulatory restrictions generally increased over this time period.
4 Table 1 lists the companies within our sample.
We indicate whether they are incorporated as stocks or mutuals as well as their states and years of incorporation. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of the date of incorporation (by decade) for the stock and mutual companies. There are two incorporations before 1830, one in 1759 (the Presbyterian Ministers Fund, which we classify as a mutual) 5 and one in 1819 (Aetna, a stock company). The last incorporation occurs in 1910 (a stock company-Citizens National Life Insurance Co.). Median incorporation dates differ by 14 years over this 152 year span-1884 and 1870 for the stocks and mutuals, respectively. Further, the distributions are indistinguishable based on the KruskalWallis equality of populations rank test (p-value ¼ 0.16). Table 3 reports the states of incorporation. Sample firms are incorporated in 30 different states. 6 There is some concentration in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, but only Massachusetts suggests a significant difference between stock and mutual companies (p-value ¼ 0.06).
7 Using the Kruskal-Wallis test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the distributions are the same for stocks and mutuals (p-value ¼ 0.74).
We also examine size distributions of stock and mutual companies. We examine total admitted assets for year-end 1911 and insurance in force for year-end 1910. Neither of these measures indicates any significant size differences in either the means or distributions. The means and distributions for total admitted assets (available for 33 stocks and 28 mutuals from the A.M. Best Co.) do not differ (t-test p-value ¼ 0.35, Kruskal-Wallis p-value ¼ 0.27), although the point estimates of the means (and medians) are larger for the 4. We examine charters and bylaws as amended. In the benchmark case in which contracting costs were zero, the date of incorporation would not affect the structure of these documents. But because amendments are costly and regulation supersedes private contracts, the observed structure in 1911 likely reflects historical circumstances.
5. The original charter of the Presbyterian Ministers Fund is not clear as to ownership structure. Stalson (1942) classifies the firm as being a mutual in 1937. No qualitative result changes with either classification.
6. The total population varies from 13 colonies in 1759 to 46 states in 1910. 7. Note that with more geographic aggregation, this apparent difference is reduced: for the New England states, there are 9 mutuals and 6 stocks; for the northeastern states, there are 18 mutuals and 19 stocks. There is other potential geographic clustering; for example, there appears to be a low incidence of mutual incorporations in the South. mutuals: $79 million versus $48 million ($20 million versus $6 million) for the mutuals and stocks, respectively.
We construct a series for insurance in force using data from Stalson (1942) . Stalson reports insurance in force for 1910 (in Appendix 15, Table B) for the 25 largest life insurance companies. We use these values for the 23 companies in our sample that are listed and assign a value slightly smaller than the smallest of the 25 largest for the remaining sample firms. This produces a size measure for all 69 firms in our sample. The means and distributions for this size measure also do not differ (t-test p-value ¼ 0.95, Kruskal-Wallis p-value ¼ 0.23). For this series the medians are identical ($100 million) and the means are $344 million for the mutuals and $336 million for the stocks. The simple correlation between this series and the total admitted assets series is 0.83 (for the 61 observations with data in both series). 8 We also look for sample characteristic differences with multivariate tests. We estimate logit regressions with a dichotomous dependent variable (cotype) that equals one if the company is mutual and zero if stock. For explanatory variables we use insurance in force (size), the year of incorporation (year), and a variable designed to account for the degree of state regulation at the time of incorporation (reg). We construct the state regulation variable using the years of first reports on insurance companies by state departments of insurance:
9 this variable equals one if the year of incorporation is more recent than the state's first report on insurance companies and zero otherwise. Thus our estimation controls for size and regulatory differences that vary over time and across states: The negative coefficient on the year of incorporation in this logit estimation suggests that later incorporations are marginally more likely to be stock companies (p-value ¼ 0.11). The coefficients on size and reg are insignificant. In our analysis of specific charter and bylaw provisions we examine the 8. Size also can be measured by initial capitalization (we use the minimum initial capitalization in the three cases where a range is given). The mean (median) initial capitalization for the stock companies is $272,917 ($112,500) and for the mutuals, $144,318 ($100,000). There is evidence which is at least marginally significant that rejects the hypothesis of equality using either the twosample t-test (p-value ¼ 0.08) or the Kruskal-Wallis test (p-value ¼ 0.12). Eliminating the three stock companies where the initial capitalization is $1 million or greater gives a mean (median) value of $164,393 ($100,000), thus the observed differences in the point estimates are driven largely by these three observations. Also, both the two-sample t-test and the Kruskal-Wallis test are seriously affected by these three observations: without the observations, the p-values are 0.51 and 0.41, respectively. (Note, however, that 10 cases of initial capitalization are unreported for mutuals, versus only one for stocks.)
9. The years of first reports on insurance companies by state departments of insurance are reported in Stalson (1942: Appendix 13) . The years range from 1853 (New Hampshire) to 1919 (Florida).
10. The logit pseudo-R 2 is 0.04. z-statistics are in parentheses. sensitivity of our results to these variables to help control for the possibility that our results are due to size differences or regulatory changes.
11
We read the charters and bylaws, identify provisions, and categorize them. For example, we refer to a restriction that limits the lines of business to life insurance and the sale of annuities as lines of business and place it in the operating policy category. Our process of collection and categorization by provision allows us to examine the frequency of a provision within the sample (as well as of a category of provisions), judge its importance (based on its frequency), and compare frequencies between stock and mutual companies.
12
We also record (but do not report) the specific language of the provision to aid in interpretation and making comparisons; it also is helpful in judging the importance of restrictions that we initially categorize broadly. For example, most companies have investment policy restrictions (one of our categories). Examining this language allows us to focus on specific investment policy restrictions.
13
The data are not complete for the 69 firms listed by The Spectator Company (1911). Two companies indicate no charter is issued (a certificate is provided instead) and that the company complies with state law. Also, there are no bylaws reported for 11 companies.
14 Since these company certificates provide details on the line-of-business restriction, we include them in our analysis. Thus, with the exception of the line-of-business restriction (where data are 11. If regulation is more episodic, these variables are potentially insufficient. For example, important regulatory laws were passed in the 1850s and 1860s, primarily in New York and Massachusetts [see, e.g., Stalson (1942: 297-304) ]. We estimate logit regressions with two other indicator variables individually in place of and in addition to reg. These variables, designed to capture the effects of increasing regulation of insurance companies, are one if the incorporation were later than or equal to 1850 (or 1860) and zero otherwise. These specifications leave our results qualitatively unchanged. The correlation of these variables with reg are 0.51 and 0.67 for the 1850 and 1860 dummies, respectively. Moreover, the Armstrong investigation (late 1905) affected insurance regulation (Roe, 1994: 60) . To determine if our results could be importantly influenced by this investigation, we examine charter amendments for all sample firms starting with 1905. We have no doubt that important changes resulted from the Armstrong investigation, but our examination reveals no changes in measures we assess.
12. Details of our data are available at www.agsm.ucr.edu/faculty/pages/mayers. That site contains an appendix (Appendix.pdf) and table (AppendixTableA1.xls) summarizing the provisions and categories that we identify. The table is organized by company type and year of incorporation (mutuals are in the upper part of the table. We report whether a particular provision appears in the charter or the bylaws (or both), and in selected cases, more about the nature of the restriction. For instance, we indicate the dollar amount when an upper limit on coverage is specified.
13. Since individual investment restrictions are numerous, we do not detail them in the appendix (cf. note 12). We discuss variations in the types of investment policy restrictions in Section 3.4.
14. The 2 companies without charters are a subset of the 11 with no bylaws. complete), the frequency of restrictions is less than 69. Of the firms with no reported bylaws, seven are stock companies and four are mutuals-we adjust for this potential selection bias in our tests when comparing mutual and stock restrictions.
Charter and Bylaw Provisions
In our analysis of charters and bylaws, we group provisions into four major classes: (1) organizational form, (2) operating policy, (3) internal control, and (4) investment, financing, and dividend policies. We examine our evidence to determine whether it is consistent with the hypothesis that insurance company charters and bylaws contain restrictions designed to control incentive conflicts among contracting parties. We first summarize each restriction and discuss how it might assist in controlling incentive conflicts between owners and managers, as well as between stockholders and policyholders. We note its apparent importance by indicating the frequency with which companies include the particular restriction. We then analyze the use of the provision by stock versus mutual companies and test whether mutual charters and bylaws are more likely than those of stock companies to include the provision.
Ownership Structure
There are three important functions within each organizational form: (1) the manager function-managers establish and implement strategy; (2) the owner function-owners provide capital and bear risk by owning claims to the organization's residual income stream; and (3) the customer function-policyholders pay premiums for the promise of indemnification if they incur specified losses. Stock insurers are characterized by the potentially complete separation of each function; mutual insurers merge customer and owner functions. Theseparation of managerand owner functions means that managers of astock company do not bear all the wealth effects of their actions. Because managers' interests generally diverge from those of owners, incentive problems exist. In addition, the separation of owners and customers within stock insurance companies creates conflicts that resemble the incentive problems between stockholders and bondholders within industrial corporations. 15 Thus changing dividend, financing, or investment policies after insurance contracts are sold potentially transfers value from policyholders to stockholders (Smith and Warner, 1979) .
In mutuals, policyholders are both customers and owners, although the rights of a mutual policyholder are more limited than the combination of stockholder and policyholder rights within a stock firm. For example, mutual policyholders' ownership rights are not transferable. 16 But by eliminating stockholders with their separate and sometimes conflicting interests, potential conflicts between owners and customers over dividend, financing, and investment policies are internalized. This benefit is likely to be especially important in long-term contracts (see Mayers and Smith, 1981) . In this case, even small policy changes can cumulate to large wealth transfers. Internalizing ownercustomer conflicts is the major benefit of the mutual organizational form.
17
This benefit from control of the owner-customer conflict is offset by less effective control of owner-manager conflicts. Specifically, inalienability of ownership rights in mutuals limits the mechanisms by which owner-manager conflicts can be controlled in at least three ways: (1) mutual managers cannot 15. For example, both bondholders and policyholders own fixed-payment claims. However, for bondholders, the promised payment is fixed across states of the world at a given date (consider a zero-coupon bond), whereas for policyholders, the payment is fixed across dates for a given state of the world (consider a single-premium life policy).
16. Hetherington (1969) , Kreider (1972) , and Anderson (1973) debate the implications of these restrictions for effective policyholder control of mutuals.
17. Note that Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that mutuals issue redeemable claims to control owner-manager conflicts. We question this explanation for mutual versus stock ownership structures. Both stock and mutual insurers can issue redeemable claims-thus although this mechanism reduces the costs of owner-manager conflicts, it fails to identify a benefit unique to mutuals. In the Fama and Jensen analysis, mutual insurance companies would be a dominated alternative.
own the stock of the company-stock ownership (as well as stock-based compensation plans) which can control owner-manager conflicts are infeasible; (2) mutual managers are not monitored by block holders (or stock analysts and institutional investors); and (3) the ability to acquire shares or form coalitions of block holders and wrest control from the existing management team is impossible in a mutual. The potential advantage of mutuals over stocks in controlling incentive problems between customers and owners thus is offset by less effective control of incentive problems between owners and managers. This suggests that if the cost of controlling managers in mutuals is higher than in stocks, then mutuals should prevail in lines where management exercises less discretion. Conversely, stock insurers should dominate in lines where managerial discretion is more important.
Restrictions on Operating Policies
Hypothesis 1. If mutuals have a comparative advantage in lines of insurance requiring less managerial discretion, mutual charters and bylaws should be more likely than those of stocks to include provisions restricting operating policies.
18
Evidence. Operating policy restrictions control managerial actions-they limit the scope of business activities within which the firm can operate. In our sample, every corporate charter limits the business activities in which the firm can engage to specific lines of insurance. Table 4 summarizes the frequencies of operating policy restrictions by organizational form. The major restriction limiting managerial discretion and the scope of business activities is the line-of-business provision. The charters of 88% (29) of the mutuals and 47% (17) of the stocks limit the company to a single line of business: life insurance. 19 The difference in these proportions is significant (p-value < 0.01). 20 Other authorized lines of business include health, accident, industrial, marine, travel, and fire insurance-underwriting in these lines is permitted more frequently by stocks (p-value < 0.01). Life insurance would appear to have more extensive loss data; moreover, the loss distribution in this
18. An alternative (but not mutually exclusive) motivation for restricting operating policies is to control conflicts among policyholders. Voting rights and policyholder dividends give mutual policyholders the potential to effect wealth transfers. These same motivations can occur in stock companies that issue participating policies and authorize policyholder voting. However, we find no difference in the distribution of authorized lines between stock companies that employ participating policies and provide policyholder voting rights and those that do not.
19. We count as equivalent ''life insurance'' and ''life insurance and the sale of annuities.'' Underwriting both life and annuity products employs the same basic data; moreover, operating in both life and annuity contracts hedges the firm against unanticipated changes in mortality rates. For example, AIDS would reduce the value of a company that writes life contracts, but increase the value of a company that writes annuities. Counting life insurance and the sale of annuities as separate lines does not change our inference: the proportions stay the same, but the statement changes to ''two or fewer lines of business: life insurance and the sale of annuities.'' 20. The z-statistics in the tables test the difference between two proportions. The test is based on a binomial approximation. We also calculate p-values using Fisher's exact test for 2 Â 2 tables [see, e.g., Siegal and Castellan (1988: 103-111)] . No qualitative result differs using this test. line seems less affected by potential future changes in technology or regulation and thus should exhibit more time-series stationarity than other lines. For these reasons we believe that life requires less managerial discretion than these other lines. Therefore the concentration of business in life insurance by mutual companies is consistent with the hypothesis that mutuals have a comparative advantage in lines requiring less discretion. And as we noted above, this advantage should be greater because standard whole-life contracts as well as annuity and most term-life contracts tend to be longer lived than those in other lines.
Frequencies of other operating restrictions reported in Table 4 also appear consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis: 28 firms specify upper limits on coverage; this represents 68% (19) of the mutuals but only 30% (9) of the stock companies; this difference in proportions is significant (p-value < 0.01). Researchers have explained upper limits primarily in terms of demand considerations [see, e.g., Parkin and Wu (1972) , Zeckhauser (1973) , Cook and Graham (1977) , Shavell (1978) , and Huberman, Mayers, and Smith (1983) ]. Raviv (1979) explains upper limits in terms of the risk preferences of insurers and a specific type of regulatory constraint. Our analysis suggests an alternative rationale: upper limits constrain managerial discretion.
Seven firms adopt other policy restrictions. Usually these restrictions specify the minimum and maximum ages at which individuals can acquire coverage. Given the distribution of mortality rates, we expect that the likelihood of adverse selection is greatest among both the very young and very old; these provisions limit such problems. The difference in proportions between stocks and mutuals is not significant (p-value ¼ 0.19). Table 4 and subsequent results also are examined with logit regressions that control for size and regulatory differences that vary across time and states. These regressions all are of the form:
where j identifies the insurance company and k the restriction. The dependent variables (restriction(k)) are indicator variables set equal to one if the company has the restriction (e.g., single line of business) and zero otherwise (e.g., multiple lines of business). The explanatory variables are as defined in Section 2. The coefficient on company type (cotype) is significantly positive in both the single line of business and upper limits on coverage regressions (p-values < 0.01). 21 Thus mutuals are more likely restricted.
Internal Control Mechanisms
Hypothesis 2. The lack of discipline from the external market for corporate control suggests mutual governance documents should employ internal control mechanisms more extensively than those of stock companies. But the managerial discretion hypothesis suggests that mutuals operate in lines requiring less discretion, thus lowering the derived demand for monitoring. Thus there are direct and indirect effects, and which effect dominates is an empirical question.
Internal Control Mechanisms: Officers and Directors
Evidence. Internal control mechanisms can promote monitoring and control incentive conflicts. Table 5 reports the frequencies of governance provisions by organizational form. 22 Except for those that pertain to the existence of designated board-appointed committees, 23 the table includes all of the provisions we identify as governance provisions.
Of the 35 firms that require staggered boards, 24 the fraction of mutuals is significantly greater than that of stocks (86% and 37%, respectively; p-value < 0.001). Conversely, among the 17 insurers that prohibit staggered boards, the proportion of stocks is significantly higher than that of mutuals (47% versus 11%; p-value < 0.01). This preference for staggered boards by mutuals is also supported in an ordered logit regression controlling for size, year of incorporation, and our state regulation variable (p-value < 0.001). 25 21. We suppress reporting more detailed regression results to conserve space. The regression examining the single line of business restriction is interesting, however. We find in addition to a significantly positive coefficient for company type, a negative coefficient on year of incorporation and a positive coefficient on the state regulation variable (p-values < 0.05). There are at least three reasons why we might observe temporal differences: (1) regulation, (2) changes in the nature of competition in the industry, or (3) evolution of the contracting technology itself. Our results suggest that holding the content of the state regulation variable and company type constant, the secular change has been to multiple lines of business, suggesting that reasons 2 and 3 have been dominant over the period of our study.
22. For Tables 5 and 6 , all frequencies and tests are based on the number of mutuals and stocks with bylaws, 28 and 30, respectively.
23. In the appendix (cf. note 12) we report board-appointed committees: executive, finance, claims, agency, and audit.
24. Staggered boards are also called classified boards. The board is divided into classes with one class standing for election each year.
25. We use an ordered logit regression here to take advantage of the available texture; the dependent variable is set to þ1 if a staggered board is required, ÿ1 if a staggered board is prohibited, and 0 if neither is specified (documents are silent). The cotype coefficient in the standard logit (þ1 if staggered board, 0 if staggered board prohibited) is also significant (p-value < 0.01).
As discussed above, mutuals should have a comparative advantage when insurance contracts have a longer duration. Thus they should more likely adopt policies, such as a staggered board structure, that encourage more focus on the longer-term consequences of business choices. For example, appointments on classified boards typically are for three years, with the terms of one-third of the board expiring each year. A staggered board also can help ensure continuity for the board and encourages board members to invest in more company-specific human capital.
26 Consistent with our argument, the mean (median) director 26. We believe it is interesting that most academic analyses focus on the role that staggered boards play in providing defenses against hostile takeovers [see, for instance, Weston, Chung, and Hoag (1990: 4990; Gaughan (1999: 178) ; Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002) ]. Yet such considerations seem unimportant in explaining staggered boards in mutual insurers; hostile takeovers are impossible in mutuals. In a mutual, a proxy fight is a possibility, and a staggered board could limit its effectiveness, but proxy fights for control of a mutual insurance company are expensive and rare: mutual insurers are not required to provide a list of their owners (customers) to a challenger. For a colorful (almost funny) description of the costs of waging a proxy fight in a mutual insurer, see the report of the Temporary National Economic Committee (1940: 14-27). term is 3.29 (3) years for mutuals versus 2.15 (1) years for stocks; these differences are significant (Kruskal-Wallis and t-test p-values < 0.01).
The fractions of mutuals and stocks with bylaws that specify the annual frequency of board of directors' meetings (82% and 90%, respectively) do not differ (p-value ¼ 0.38). But of the total of 52 firms (with and without bylaws) that specify the frequency of board meetings, the mean (median) number of meetings per year are 9.6 (12) versus 6.7 (4) for mutuals and stocks, respectively. These differences are only weakly significant (the two-tailed KruskalWallis and t-test p-values are 0.27 and 0.17, respectively).
There are 37 firms with bylaws that require an annual audit of the firm's books or stockholder/policyholder panels of inspectors to oversee elections; 27 these audits and inspections provide additional external monitoring of managers. Requiring that officers post surety bonds helps an officer credibly promise that dysfunctional activities will be avoided (27 firms). A requirement for specific signatures by officers to bind coverage should encourage mutual monitoring among officers (32 firms), thus reducing managerial discretion. In our sample, the use of neither inspectors/auditors, officer bonds, nor required signatures to bind differ significantly between mutuals and stocks. Finally, requiring losses be paid within a prescribed time period (11 firms) limits managerial discretion; this provision is employed more frequently in mutuals (p-value < 0.10). This result is robust; it obtains if we control for size, year of incorporation, and our state regulation variable (p-value < 0.10).
Provisions specifying the number of directors (58 firms), the number of officers (56 firms), that certain officers also be directors (41 firms), or stipulating a quorum of directors (49 firms) relate to the composition of the board of directors. The importance of board composition in the corporate governance process has been examined by Weisbach (1988) , Byrd and Hickman (1992) , Lee et al. (1992) , Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) , Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) , and Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997) , among others.
Differences in the frequencies of restrictions between stocks and mutuals with respect to the number of directors, the number of officers, and specifying a quorum are not significant, but our tests lack power. First, the restrictions we find frequently express board size as a range, and that range can be largefor instance, in the case of Wisconsin Life, the board shall have at least 5, but not more than 50 directors. Second, these provisions are difficult to evaluate without other company data. For example, most studies of boards suggest that board size is a function of the size of the firm-larger firms tend to have larger boards. Finally, Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997) argue that the 27. Annual audit provisions vary as to whom is to perform the audit: 12 firms (9 mutual and 3 stock) mention specifically that outsiders (including professional accountants) should be employed. Others empower nonofficer policyholders, stockholders, or directors, usually in an audit committee, with no mention of professional accountants. Some of the provisions are vague, for example, ''board of directors cause an estimate to be made of profits and true state of the affairs'' (The Spectator Company, 1911: 188) . There is also evidence of a temporal difference in the use of these provisions-they occur more frequently in the earlier documents-before 1873 (p-value < 0.10). This suggests that regulation displaced private contractual solutions. managerial discretion hypothesis has implications for the fraction of outside directors; mutuals should have a higher fraction of outside directors than stocks operating on similar lines.
In the cases of the restrictions on board composition in Table 5 , the implications of the managerial discretion hypothesis for differences between stocks and mutuals are unclear. Although the requirement that certain officers be directors is more common for stocks, the significance of the difference in proportions appears weak in the simple comparison (p-value ¼ 0.11). But the use of this restriction also evidences temporal change-it occurs more frequently before 1873. The logit regression we estimate which controls for size, year of incorporation, and our state regulation variable shows a significant negative coefficient on company type (p-value < 0.05). (The coefficient on year of incorporation is also negative and significant in this regression; p-value < 0.05.) This suggests the importance of the restriction that certain officers be directors for stock companies. But the p-value potentially understates the importance of this difference. Eleven of the 17 mutual provisions use the same language as in stock company provisions. 28 However, five of the remaining six use language that suggests more board independence; for example, one company indicates officers may or may not be members of the board. Three indicate the officer chosen by the directors ''shall be a director ex-officio'' (presumably they have no vote), and one indicates the officers who serve as trustees ''hold office at the pleasure of the board.'' Finally, 1 mutual among the 17 (The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company) actually specifies that none of the officers ''shall be trustees'' (The Spectator Company, 1911: 252) . If we incorporate this difference in language into an ordered logit regression estimation, the results strongly suggest that board independence is more important for mutuals (p-value < 0.01).
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A requirement for a vote of directors to fire officers (24 firms) potentially indicates more board oversight of officers and thus implies less managerial discretion. Alternatively, the provision might raise the cost of dismissing an officer, implying greater managerial entrenchment. The difference between stocks and mutuals with respect to this provision is not significant.
The last restriction in Table 5 is that of director eligibility (48 firms). We find two primary types of director eligibility restrictions: directors are required to be (1) stockholders or policyholders (incentive restriction) or (2) citizens or residents of the state of incorporation (residence restriction). 30 Requiring that directors be residents of the state of incorporation can limit transportation costs for attending board meetings, thus encouraging attendance by board members. Requiring share ownership for directors of stock companies and policy 28. Typical language for a stock company is, ''shall be chosen from the board,'' or ''elect from their number.'' 29. For the ordered logit, the dependent variable is set equal to 2 if the language is the same as in stock company provisions, 1 if the weaker language is used, 0 if silent, and ÿ1 if none of the officers ''shall be trustees.'' 30. A third requirement-that the director not hold a similar office in another insurance company-holds for two mutual companies. Also, some firms require either share or insurance policy ownership (e.g., a mutual with a guaranty fund or a stock that sells participating policies).
ownership for directors of mutual companies can help align director incentives. The proportions of mutual and stock companies with director eligibility restrictions in Table 4 differ only weakly (p-value ¼ 0.13), but the types of restrictions differ more strongly: mutuals tend to use the residence restriction more than stocks (74% versus 39%; p-value < 0.05) and stock companies use the incentive restriction more than mutuals (96% versus 70%; p-value < 0.05). 31 We also identify several standing board committees: executive, finance, claims, agency, and audit. The mean (median) number of designated committees is 2.82 (3) and 2.40 (2) for mutual and stock companies, respectively. The Kruskal-Wallis test (p-value ¼ 0.38) and two-sample t-test (p-value ¼ 0.26) fail to reject the null hypotheses that the distributions or means of the number of committees are the same. Evidence. The frequencies of provisions that specify rights for shareholders and policyholders are contained in Table 6 . Limitation of shareholder and policyholder liability (13 firms) or provisions specifying rights to assess (2 firms), assign (4 firms), or inspect the books (5 firms) are uncommon. Of these provisions, only the right to inspect the books seems relevant for the managerial discretion or monitoring hypothesis. Use of these provisions does not vary between stocks and mutuals at standard levels of significance.
For the 54 firms that specify shareholder and policyholder voting rights in the charter or bylaws, the frequency is not significantly higher for mutuals than stocks: 96% and 90%, respectively. However, we note that the stock companies without a voting rights provision are all more recent incorporations. 33 This potentially reflects the codification of share voting rights (at one share one vote) over the period of our study. Policyholder voting rights are more varied in the cross section than are stockholders' and thus more difficult to reduce to a simple code.
We find only four nonstandard (other than one share one vote) vote assignments for stocks, 34 whereas there are 10 variations of policyholder voting rights across the mutuals, and no dominant standard. For example, there 31. These proportions are based on the number of firms with restrictions (with or without bylaws): 23 and 28 for mutuals and stocks, respectively. 32. We also estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression controlling for size (insurance in force). The estimation shows a positive association with size (p-value ¼ 0.004) and a positive, but weak association with company type; an indicator variable with mutual ¼ 1.0 (p-value ¼ 0.26). We also note that the frequency with which executive committees are designated has increased significantly since 1873 (p-value < 0.01).
33. These incorporations occurred in 1902 These incorporations occurred in , 1903 These incorporations occurred in , and 1905 . The most recent nonstandard voting arrangement for stock companies is for National Life Insurance (incorporated in 1904) , where the number of votes per share equals the number of directors (a form of cumulative voting). Other nonstandard voting arrangements for stocks are all from earlier incorporations and include 1 share one vote up to 10 shares, then every 5 shares over 10 earn one vote (Provident Life and Trust, 1856) , 50 shares maximum ownership per person (Pittsburgh Life and Trust, 1840) , and 50 votes maximum, independent of ownership (Aetna, 1819).
are nine firms that allow strictly one vote for each policyholder (the modal voting scheme), but more that allocate more votes for larger policies.
35 Policyholder voting rights in stock companies (nine companies) vary significantly from those in mutuals; for example, policyholder voting in stocks is always one vote per policyholder, whereas 13 of the 22 mutuals that stipulate policyholder voting allow additional votes for large policies (p-value < 0.01). Another difference is that when policyholders vote in stock companies, they usually must vote in person (5 cases out of 9), whereas there is only 1 case among the 22 mutuals that excludes proxy voting for policyholders (p-value < 0.01). Thus we find evidence of voting rights assignments in both stocks (for stockholders) and mutuals (for policyholders) that are consistent with the provisions being designed to control owner-manager incentive conflicts.
Policyholder rights also are affected by provisions that include the right to limited liability, the right to assess, and the right to purchase participating policies. Although only eight firms explicitly grant policyholders limited liability, assessments are rare. When notified of an assessment, policyholders have strong incentives for nonrenewal and to default. The use of participating policies, which give the policyholder a claim on a fraction of the insurance firm's 35. Other variations include one vote per policyholder with one additional vote for each $5000 of insurance over $5000; one vote if insured for $5000 or more; one vote plus one additional vote for each $1000 of insurance; one vote if insurance does not exceed $2000, two votes when insurance is between $2000 and $5000, and three votes if insurance is greater than $5000; one vote if insurance is at least $1000; one vote for each $5000 of insurance with a maximum of six votes; one vote for the first $25 of premiums and one additional vote for every $50 of premiums; and one vote for each $500 of indemnity. accounting earnings, 36 is an alternative method of achieving similar ends without creating incentives for customer nonrenewals and defaults. With a participating policy, the insurer charges a higher premium at the beginning of the contract and pays a dividend to policyholders if operating and investment income are within normal expectations.
Restrictions on Investment, Financing, and Dividend Policies
Hypothesis 3. Restrictions on investment, financing, and dividend policy limit managerial discretion, thereby controlling both owner-manager and owner-customer incentive conflicts. Since the marginal benefit of such provisions may be greater within stock companies-given their focus on lines of insurance with more managerial discretion-the relative frequency of such provisions in stock versus mutual charters and bylaws is an empirical issue.
Evidence. As indicated in Table 7 , restrictions on investment policy are common among our sample companies and are observed in approximately equal proportions across stock and mutual companies: 25 stock and 26 mutual firms have such charter or bylaw provisions. Restrictions on the types of assets (37 firms), 37 approval requirements (25 firms), requirements that investments be in the company name (18 firms), 38 and coverage requirements for loans (17 firms) 39 appear equally likely for stock and mutual companies. The real estate investment restriction (16 firms), however, does not.
Real estate restrictions explicitly limit ownership of real estate to that required for offices, and appear in the documents of 12 mutuals but only 4 stocks; this difference in proportions is significant (p-value < 0.05). This difference remains significant (p-value < 0.05) in the logit regression controlling for size, year of incorporation, and our state regulation variable. Because real estate is more heterogeneous than most assets in which an insurer might invest, this restriction appears consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis. Other restrictions are similar to this outright prohibition on real estate investment and are more common for mutuals; for example, four mutuals (and no stocks) are authorized investments, as are permitted savings banks (which generally 36. This acts somewhat like a convertibility provision in a corporate bond contract, except that the policy holder has a claim only to current accounting earnings, whereas the convertible bondholder has a claim to the capitalized value of the economic cash flows [see, e.g., Mayers and Smith (1981) ].
37. This restriction count is quite generous and includes any kind of a restriction, for example, ''as permitted by the State of Iowa,'' or any mention of particular types of securities as being appropriate.
38. We do not understand completely the restriction that investments be made only in the company name. Although the restriction appears to be written to control an owner-manager conflict, we find no provision stating that officers should not steal. Yet this restriction appears to belong in a similar category. 39. A typical coverage requirement for a loan is that the appraised value of real estate used as collateral be twice the value of the loan. Coverage values in our sample range from 50% to 200% for real estate.
would exclude investments in real estate). 40 Real estate typically is mentioned in the charters and bylaws of both stocks and mutuals, but usually as collateral for loans, not authorized as a direct investment vehicle. Only one mutual explicitly authorizes real estate for investment purposes (but then only in Boston); three stock companies explicitly authorize real estate as an investment. Thus mutuals appear more constrained in their ability to invest in real estate than stock companies.
Investment provisions of mutual companies also are more likely to include geographic restrictions (p-value < 0.10). This difference is marginally significant (p-value ¼ 0.10) in the logit regression controlling for size, year of incorporation, and our state regulation variable.
Geographic restrictions typically limit investment within a particular class to be within the state of incorporation. For example, loans on real estate in other states can be limited or prohibited. Since geographic and real estate investment restrictions need not be independent, we also test whether the proportions of the union of real estate and geographic restrictions differ between mutual and stock companies. This difference appears significant (p-value < 0.05).
Restrictions on the firm's financing are rare; they limit the amount of debt the firm can issue. Five companies (two mutual and three stock) have such provisions. 41 Limits are placed either on the dollar amount of debt financing or on debt as a fraction of the company's capital stock. We find no difference in the frequencies of these restrictions between stocks and mutuals.
Dividend policy provisions (33 firms) can limit dividends paid to capital owners to a percentage of par value, and then only if certain surplus requirements are met, or they can provide more general guidance, such as ''no dividend if the capital stock is impaired.'' 42 We examine the frequencies of dividend policy provisions between mutuals and stocks, restricting our comparison to those firms with capital stock outstanding and for which we have both charter and bylaws. We find a significant difference: 86% (12) of 14 mutuals that indicate an issuance of capital stock and 60% (18) of 30 stocks have such provisions (p-value < 0.10). 43 This difference remains only weakly significant (p-value ¼ 0.15) in the logit regression controlling for size, year of incorporation, and our state regulation variable.
We also examine whether mutuals are more constrained by their dividend policy restrictions than stock companies by examining limitations on payout policies. Dividend policy provisions allow the board of directors to set dividends, but frequently constrain the size of the dividend (e.g., not to exceed some fixed percentage-for instance, 7% of par value). In our sample, l1 of the 14 mutual companies (79%) and 10 of the 19 stocks (53%) with dividend provisions are so constrained. The significance of the difference, between 79% and 53%, is weak (p-value ¼ 0.13), but effective sample sizes are small.
In summary, mutuals are more restricted than stock companies in their investment operations: mutuals are more constrained geographically and they are more limited in their ability to invest in real estate. Mutuals with capital stock also are more likely to be limited by dividend policy provisions than are stock companies. Hence our investment and dividend policy evidence reinforces our operating and governance policy evidence, suggesting mutuals are more constrained by charter and bylaw restrictions. 44 This supports the hypothesis that required managerial discretion is more limited in mutuals than in stocks.
Conclusion
We examine corporate charter and bylaw provisions from a sample of 69 insurance companies with incorporations spanning the 19th century. We find that charter and bylaw provisions differ in predictable ways across organizational forms. The differences for mutual and stock insurers are consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis. Charters and bylaws in mutual insurance companies restrict operating policies to a greater extent than do those in stocks. For instance, mutuals are more likely to restrict underwriting to a single line of insurance and to specify upper limits on coverage. Mutual insurers' investment 42. Capital stock can be issued by mutual insurers as part of their initial startup process; this capital (often referred to as a guaranty fund) is retired if the firm is successful. An alternative startup method is to require a minimum number of subscribers before the mutual is allowed to commence business.
43. We assess which mutuals have capital stock by examining the charters and bylaws; 14 sets of mutual documents provide no indication.
44. A potential limitation of our analysis is that we do not examine corporate statutes in force at the time of incorporation. Such an investigation would attempt to determine whether a particular charter restriction is contractual or regulatory. policies are more constrained by restrictions limiting their ability to invest in real estate as well as the geographic scope of their investments. Mutual insurers with capital stock are more likely to be controlled by dividend policy provisions than are stock companies. By limiting managerial discretion, the costs of less effective managerial control within mutuals is reduced.
We also examine the evidence to determine whether mutuals more extensively specify internal governance mechanisms. We find that mutual directors have longer terms and are more likely to serve within a classified board. A staggered board structure with longer terms can help ensure continuity while encouraging board members to invest in company-specific human capital. Mutual boards also meet more frequently. Finally, our evidence suggests that board independence is more important for mutuals. These features suggest the monitoring role of mutual boards is enhanced relative to that of stock companies by charter and bylaw provisions.
Our evidence on the use of classified boards and upper limits on coverage is particularly noteworthy. The standard explanation for a classified board focuses on its role as an antitakeover mechanism. Their use by mutuals suggests this explanation is incomplete. Extant explanations of the use of upper limits on coverage mainly emphasize demand considerations. Their specification in charters and bylaws suggests a control rationale, as well.
Our results are of special interest given recent regulations that codify governance practices, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Contract theory suggests that private incentives exist within organizations to maximize value. Our evidence is consistent with this proposition. Rather than just legal boilerplate, the governance documents we examine vary across firms and appear to be thoughtfully structured to control incentive problems. One cost of codifying governance practices is that firms are not permitted to opt out of these regulations. To illustrate, suppose that 90% of firms would benefit from a particular governance mechanism. Without regulation, those firms would face strong incentives to voluntarily adopt it; with regulation, costs will be imposed on the remaining 10%. We also provide evidence that provisions evolve over time. In part, this reflects the fact that as the environment within which firms operate changes, optimal provisions change. But in addition, organizational structure evolves over time through a Darwinian process (see Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958; and Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Another cost of codification is that both opportunities for and incentives to innovate organizational structure are reduced. This is a cost that, although small at adoption of the regulation, cumulates over time.
